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TAB "A"

A C OF S, G-2 CONTRIBUTION TO SE-20: "THE EFFECT ON THE COMMUNISTS  
OF CERTAIN U. S. COURSES OF ACTION"

I. MAJOR OFFENSIVE USING ALL AVAILABLE WEAPONS

A. If the U S should press the war more vigorously in Korea using all available weapons and, in conjunction with this offensive, carry out bombing attacks on military installations and lines of communications in Manchuria, what would be the vulnerability of the Chinese Communist to this course of action?

1. It is estimated that a more vigorous prosecution of the Korean operations by the United States, using all available weapons and including bombing of military targets in Manchuria, would have serious adverse effect upon the logistic system of the Chinese Communist Forces.

2. Bombing of important rail centers in Manchuria would disrupt significantly the present rate of flow of military traffic supporting the Communist operations in Korea. The present troop replacement system of the Chinese Communists would be impaired to the extent that their problems of deployment and supply of forces in combat in Korea would be greatly increased and felt all along a line of communications of approximately 1,500 miles. If the Mukden arsenal were subjected to heavy bombing attacks, the production probably would be reduced sufficiently to force an additional drain upon U.S.S.R. resources.

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3. At present, the guerrilla movement on the China mainland is more latent than active. An increase of Communist military requirements in Red China to meet greater operational demands in Korea, might serve to divert Chinese Communist Forces now engaged in guerrilla suppression and thus create an opportunity for increased guerrilla activity.

B. What reaction from the Communists could be expected?

1. It is estimated that the Communist would react to more vigorous United Nations warfare in Korea, using all available weapons and including bombing of military targets in Manchuria, by: (1) intensified employment of their own air power, and (2) by passive tactical means, such as greater dispersion, less heavy equipment, and lesser use of vehicular transport in the forward areas.

2. Bombing of military installations (other than airfields) and lines of communication in Manchuria, would probably cause the Communist to rely to a greater extent upon animal and porter transport.

3. The Communist reaction towards the course of action discussed herein would probably permit them to continue operations in Korea despite the greater losses which they would suffer. It is impossible to estimate what their casualties would be if Korean operations of the U S involved all available weapons. However, they

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are capable of, and probably would be willing to accept much greater casualties than they have suffered so far.

II. (No contribution).

III. (No contribution).

IV. (No contribution).

V. CHINESE NATIONALIST ATTACK WITH U. S. LOGISTIC SUPPORT

A. What is the vulnerability of Communist China to attacks by the Chinese Nationalists supported logistically by the U.S?

1. The long coastline of Communist China and the close proximity of hostile forces on Formosa makes Communist China vulnerable to attacks by the Chinese Nationalists. The success of such attacks would depend upon the degree of U. S. logistic support.

2. Under conditions of presently contemplated U.S. aid, with removal of restrictions on Nationalist operations against the mainland, it is believed that after receipt of the aid and after training in its use, the Nationalists could establish a base of operations on the mainland. They probably could not hold such a base indefinitely nor exploit it unless U. S. aid was materially increased to provide for the requirements of a major undertaking.

3. Under conditions of greatly expanded U. S. logistic support, but not operational support, the Chinese Nationalists could probably establish a larger and more secure area of operations

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on the mainland. The exploitation of it would then depend upon the availability of additional manpower. There are some 2.4 million males of military age on Formosa, but the number physically fit is unknown. Defection from some Chinese Communists' units and the possible use of guerrillas might prove to be minor and probably inadequate sources of manpower. The only immediately available supply would be Formosan youths. They would have to be inducted, equipped, and trained in significant numbers prior to an invasion of the mainland to insure timely exploitation of the base of operations established by the invasion. However, even under these conditions, it is unlikely that the Chinese Nationalists could hold their mainland base indefinitely.

B. What would be the Communist reaction to this course of action?

1. It is estimated that the Communist would react vigorously to any Nationalist operation against the mainland. Regardless of the degree of U. S. logistic support, it is believed that the Nationalists could not retain their mainland base against prolonged Communist counter-attack.

**VI. CHINESE NATIONALIST INVASION WITH U. S. LOGISTIC, NAVAL AND AIR SUPPORT**

A. If the U. S. provided full logistic support plus naval and air support for the Chinese Nationalists, what would be the Chinese Communist vulnerability to Chinese Nationalist invasion?

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1. It is estimated that an invasion of this nature would enable the Chinese Nationalists to secure a larger base of operations and hold it for a longer time than they could without the support cited in this situation. The one thing the Nationalists would need most, however, and which it is not contemplated the U. S. would give them, is support with U. S. ground forces. The manpower available to the Nationalists in Formosa, as well as what they might acquire from the mainland after invasion, would probably be inadequate for them to exploit the area of operation to the extent that it would actually threaten the Communist regime. To do so probably would require an all-out war effort of the United States. It is believed that present commitments and obligations elsewhere would not permit that effort. However, it is estimated that if Chinese Nationalist Forces were employed in Korea, under U. N. direction, the manpower factor would become relatively minor, and the United States could give them the necessary logistic support there without jeopardizing seriously other requirements elsewhere; and that the Nationalist Army would be effective.

B. What would be the Communist reaction to this course of action?

1. The Communists would undoubtedly make a determined effort to destroy any force seeking to invade the China mainland.

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It is estimated that the Chinese Communists have approximately 750,000 CCF troops south of the Yangtze River, of which at least 500,000 could be brought to bear against an invasion in South China in approximately 30 days. About the same force could probably be thrown against a North China invasion.

2. It is also estimated that the U.S.S.R. would increase its support to the Chinese Communists in Korea to steps just short of war, employing measures in every category to halt the U. N. offensive there. They probably would also increase their aid to the Chinese Communists, as necessary, for counter-attack against any and all forces engaged in an invasion of mainland China.

**VII. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF SEVERAL OR ALL OF THESE COURSES OF ACTION**

A. What would be the cumulative vulnerability of Communist China if the U. S. undertook several or all of the courses of action discussed above?

1. The cumulative effect of any combination of courses of action discussed, except the combination of all at one time, would impose much greater loads on the Chinese Communist logistic vulnerability. Their logistic system however could still enable the Chinese Communists to continue operations in Korea, but subject to Soviet support.

2. If all U. S. courses of action were taken concurrently, the Chinese Communists' logistic vulnerability would probably force

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them to withdraw their forces from Korea, and to make a major effort to defeat the Nationalist invasion.

B. What would be the Communist reaction to several or all of these courses of action?

1. In Korea, the Chinese Communists would probably employ their air power vigorously to off-set any material gain the U. S. might make there by intensified operations and using all available weapons.

2. If all U. S. courses of action were taken concurrently, it is estimated that the U.S.S.R. would commit ground air-control and air-defense units to aid the Chinese Communists to defend Manchuria; and in addition, would commit air and naval units to aid the Chinese Communists against a Nationalist invasion.

3. If the Soviets felt compelled to intervene with their own forces to aid the Chinese Communists, the U.S.S.R. would probably localize their military action and attempt to avoid global war.

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**ANNEX "C" TO TAB "A"**

**"NATIONALIST CHINA"**

**A. OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES**

1. At the present time, the Chinese Nationalists could not invade the China mainland without U. S. logistic, and operational air and naval support. After receipt of proposed U. S. materiel aid and after training in its use, the Nationalists could establish a landing on the mainland with an estimated force of 10 infantry divisions, provided the U. S. continued logistic support to the invasion force.

2. The Nationalists' ability to hold a beach-head, or area of operations on the mainland, would depend upon the intensity of the Chinese Communist counter-attack. Thus, it might become necessary for the U. S. to provide operational air and naval support to enable the Nationalists to maintain their invasion force. The Nationalists could not exploit their base of operations on the mainland without additional manpower. Under present conditions, the Nationalists could make available only about 200,000 ground troops to invade the mainland. Granted maximum success of the invasion, it would not be militarily possible to strip Formosa of all its defensive forces.

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3. The degree to which a Nationalist invasion of the mainland could be exploited would depend upon the additional military manpower which could be procured by mass induction of Formosan youths, the support of guerrilla units in the area of the invasion, and by defection of some Chinese Communists units.

4. Mass induction of Formosan youths would probably not be possible unless the U. S. expanded greatly its proposed MDAP aid and was willing to provide logistic support during combat operations to a force larger than the present military establishment of National China.

**B. MILITARY STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION**

**1. Army**

a. Strength 451,000

b. Organization

12 Armies; 38 Infantry Divisions

4 Armored Groups

1 Paratroop Group

3 Fort Commands

5 Independent Regiments

2 Independent Battalions

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